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Diffstat (limited to 'i/pc104/initrd/conf/busybox/loginutils/su.c')
-rw-r--r--i/pc104/initrd/conf/busybox/loginutils/su.c103
1 files changed, 103 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/i/pc104/initrd/conf/busybox/loginutils/su.c b/i/pc104/initrd/conf/busybox/loginutils/su.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a786cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i/pc104/initrd/conf/busybox/loginutils/su.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
+/*
+ * Mini su implementation for busybox
+ *
+ * Licensed under the GPL v2 or later, see the file LICENSE in this tarball.
+ */
+
+#include "busybox.h"
+#include <syslog.h>
+
+#define SU_OPT_mp (3)
+#define SU_OPT_l (4)
+
+int su_main(int argc, char **argv);
+int su_main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned flags;
+ char *opt_shell = NULL;
+ char *opt_command = NULL;
+ const char *opt_username = "root";
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
+ const char *tty;
+ char *old_user;
+
+ flags = getopt32(argc, argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ if (argc && LONE_DASH(argv[0])) {
+ flags |= SU_OPT_l;
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+
+ /* get user if specified */
+ if (argc) {
+ opt_username = argv[0];
+// argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
+ /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to identify
+ the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell.
+ But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
+ in this case resort to getpwuid. */
+ old_user = xstrdup(USE_FEATURE_UTMP(getlogin() ? : ) (pw = getpwuid(cur_uid)) ? pw->pw_name : "");
+ tty = ttyname(2) ? : "none";
+ openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
+ }
+
+ pw = getpwnam(opt_username);
+ if (!pw)
+ bb_error_msg_and_die("unknown id: %s", opt_username);
+
+ /* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL. It may be NULL when NEW_USER
+ is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), but that doesn't have
+ a default shell listed. */
+ if (!pw->pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell[0])
+ pw->pw_shell = (char *)DEFAULT_SHELL;
+
+ if ((cur_uid == 0) || correct_password(pw)) {
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
+ '+', tty, old_user, opt_username);
+ } else {
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
+ '-', tty, old_user, opt_username);
+ bb_error_msg_and_die("incorrect password");
+ }
+
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
+ closelog();
+ free(old_user);
+ }
+
+ if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp))
+ opt_shell = getenv("SHELL");
+
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS
+ if (opt_shell && cur_uid && restricted_shell(pw->pw_shell)) {
+ /* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
+ probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't
+ compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
+ shell. */
+ bb_error_msg("using restricted shell");
+ opt_shell = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!opt_shell)
+ opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;
+
+ change_identity(pw);
+ setup_environment(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, !(flags & SU_OPT_mp), pw);
+ USE_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(NULL);)
+
+ /* Never returns */
+ run_shell(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, opt_command, (const char**)argv);
+
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+}